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 Abstract 
The wounds from the bloody conflict over Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia are 
still very much unhealed in the Newborn state. This thesis purpose is to examine 
why there has been a failure to establish a base for reconciliation between the two 
largest ethnic communities in Kosovo, the Kosovo Albanians and the Kosovo 
Serbs. It initially gives a thorough account of the conflict in Kosovo by describing 
a history of apartheid, distrust amongst the two communities and open warfare.  
The analysis that follows is based on the theory for sustainable reconciliation 
from Lederach from which crucial components of reconciliation are 
conceptualized and used to form the analytical framework.  Through three 
dimensions, “Coexistence & Integration”, “Rule of Law & Justice” and “Civil 
Society & Participation” this thesis finds that the lack of security, freedom of 
movement, weakness of the judicial system and weak civil society enforce the 
deep divisions that have resulted from more than a decade of ethnic tension in 
Kosovo. 
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 1 Introduction 
“Everything started with Kosovo and everything will finish with Kosovo”, this is 
a citiation  that refers to the coming of power of Slobodan Milosevic and his 
nationalist stand that would eventually lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia, it also 
serves to show the importance of stability in Kosovo for the whole region 
(Vickers, 1998:289). In 1999, after a violent conflict in Kosovo,  NATO launched 
an air campaing against Serbian militiary and paramilitary forces in Kosovo, 
which would last 78 days and bring about the retreat of all Serbian forces from the 
territory of Kosovo. The UN adopted the Security Council Resolution 1244 
establishing the umbrella organization UNMIK that consits of the UN, NATO, 
OSCE and the EU (Knudsen & Laustsen, 2006:12). These organizations were 
given the difficult task of administrating the whole of Kosovo, being the first time 
the UN undertook such a project, it presented the UN with a rather unique 
experiment (Söberg in Knudsen & Laustsen (ed), 2006:57).  
Since then over eight years have passed and the UN is preparing to relinquish 
control over the territory to its elected representatives. On the 17th of february 
2008 the democratically elected leaders of Kosovo declared the independence of 
Kosovo. This highly simbolic and historical act was met with fierce opposition by 
the serbian minority in Kosovo. Mass protests in the ethnically divided northern 
city of Mitrovica turned violent only one week after the declaration of 
independence and is only one of recent acts of mobilized ethnic violence 
threatening the peace in Kosovo,  violence that in essence hights the fragile peace 
created in Kosovo.  
These ethnically motivatied acts of violence raise important questions that 
might serve to prove a key lesson to future international missions of peace. The 
case of Kosovo leaves us with the oppertunity to look back and examine why such 
a wide-reaching and activly engadged international mission of peace has been 
unable to set the ground for the reconciliation in Kosovo, leaving the territory 
ethnically divided. 
1.1 Statement of purpose 
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to examine why there has been a failure to 
establish a base for the process of reconciliation. This will help me explain why 
there has been a failure to bridge divisions in the disputed territory and set the 
foundations for sustainable peace. Essentially the hope is to depict the importance 
of reconciliation between ethnic groups as a major step from conflict to 
sustainable peace. A key purpose of this thesis is also to highlight the obstacles 
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 facing inter-ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo since every case is unique in itself. In 
this regard I will also present the responsibilities of the international presence in 
Kosovo. Reconciliation is not a process that is easily assessed as a failure, success 
and/or completed, a reality that reflects the formulation of my study aim and 
questions. 
This thesis will argue that what is needed to subdue threats of ethnic violence 
and prevent a future violent conflict in Kosovo is for international organizations to 
assist in locally driven processes for reconciliation. The two first questions are of 
descriptive nature and are necessary if we are to understand the context while 
question three is of explanatory nature and this study’s main question. 
 
The questions that this thesis seek to answer are therefore:  
 
• What are the historical obstacles facing reconciliation in Kosovo?  
• What is the responsibilities and tasks of the international presence in 
Kosovo?  
• Why has there been a failure to establish a base for the process of 
reconciliation in Kosovo?  
1.2 Theoretical background 
Obviously the nature of my thesis will require me to conceptualize important 
aspects of conflict transformation. There is an apparent need to clarify 
reconciliation, justice and peace, and in so doing, determine the instrument of 
measure that will form the base for my analysis of reconciliation in Kosovo. This 
section will cover what reconciliation is, how it can be achieved and why it is 
important for peace.  
1.2.1 Conceptualizing reconciliation, justice and peace? 
There is truly no single answer to what reconciliation is. It is a complex term 
because it is both a goal and process striving to reach the goal. It also 
encompasses aspects such as justice and peace. John Paul Lederach, who has 
spent many years working in divided societies and has wide experience of peace 
building, argues that what is needed for sustainable peace is a broad approach that 
takes into account many aspects of society based on the experience and reality 
shaping people’s needs (Lederach, 1997:24). Reconciliation is in this context 
viewed as the building and/or restoration of relationships in divided societies 
(Ibid). It is not about working to minimize groups’ affiliations but about creating 
the base for coexistence and engaging the sides of a conflict as “humans-in-
relationship” (Lederach, 1997:26). Reconciliation is according to the international 
institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ideally, the reparation of past 
injustices and the building of non-violent relationships between communities 
 2
 (Bloomfield et al, 2003:20). Ledarach also outlines how reconciliation can be 
brought about and sees the bottom-up approach as the approach that will activate 
most of the population in the process (Lederach, 1997:39). Here local NGOs play 
a crucial role since they have the opportunity to work in a community level 
(Lederach, 1997:55). This obviously brings up important questions of who should 
own the process; those that advocate for the bottom-up approach argue that “the 
foundation of the house has to be laid if the roof is to hold” while those that 
advocate for the top-down approach argue that “the head most first be constructed 
in order for the body to function” (Lederach, 1997:1997). These both approaches 
are crucial pointing to the need of an integrated framework that incorporates 
aspects of both approaches. The top-down strategy can help initiate and assist the 
process of reconciliation while the bottom-up approach, that obviously reaches 
more, is branded as potentially successful since it can utilize home-grown and 
local initiatives (Bloomfield et al, 2003:25). A combination of approaches and 
initiatives is also important for the reason that one size does not fit all and that the 
actions must take into account the nature of the conflict and build upon the 
uniqueness of each conflict (Ibid). 
Reconciliation is therefore a “place” that includes clarification about 
atrocities, support and justice for victims and the creation of security for a better 
future (Lederach, 1997:28ff).  In practical terms this means that any society that 
strives to reckon with past crimes should investigate and make the truth public 
(Crocker in Prager & Govier (ed), 2003:44). This aspect is important since 
knowing who the perpetrators are helps individualize guilt. On the other hand this 
highlights one of the crucial dilemmas of reconciliation; truth does not only have 
its benefits but also its downside regardless of how absurd this might sound. Truth 
can cost too much by deepening ethnic divisions (Crocker in Prager & Govier 
(ed), 2003:46). In order to individualize guilt, a factor that is seemingly important 
in ethnically divided societies such as Kosovo, trials are believed to be better 
suited than truth commissions (Crocker in Prager & Govier (ed), 2003:47). In 
connection to this the rule of law is a sector that needs to be supported and 
developed so that those that committed crimes are held accountable for their acts.  
The rule of law also contributes to the prevention of acts of revenge on the part of 
individuals which means that it is highly important to help create an environment 
where justice is made by treating all impartially (Crocker in Prager & Govier (ed), 
2003:50f). Some even argue that without justice there can never really be peace 
(Montville in Abu-Nimer (ed), 2001:129).  
Making sure that justice is made requires us to define what justice means. 
Obviously different sides of the conflict will have different notions of justice 
(Pankhurst, 1999:241). What justice is for the Kosovo Serbs might not be the 
same as what justice is for the Kosovo Albanians; both sides might conceive their 
part of the conflict as fighting with just causes and might not understand why they 
are to be made accountable for only “rightfully protecting” what is theirs. The 
challenge is therefore to create a notion of justice that is to some degree 
acceptable to both sides of the conflict.  The dilemma is also how many to include 
in prosecution. If only political leaders are brought to justice then justice might 
end up being partial and incomplete, but bringing too many to justice might prove 
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 a logistical problem and might even be inappropriate if reconciliation is to be 
hoped for (Pankhurst, 1999:242).  
Justice in this aspect may also mean the protection of basic human rights, such 
as the freedom of movement and the protection of property if peace is to be built 
and maintained.  This maximalist conception of the rule of law gives a broadened 
view of what is needed for long-term engagements in maintaining peace 
(Pankhurst, 1999:243).  Justice is from this point of view conceptualized as 
restorative justice, which is a justice that not only strives to punish criminals but 
also to repair the injuries from the crime (Estrada-Hollenbeck in Abu-Nimer (ed), 
2001:74). In this approach the actual law-breaking is secondary and what 
constitutes primarily as the crime is the conflict between individuals that has 
resulted in injustices (Ibid). This approach is hailed as more appropriate than 
retributive justice with the critique that retributive justice misses to take into 
account important factors such as the victims suffering and the life situation of the 
offenders (Forget in Prager & Govier (ed), 2003:116). A restorative justice 
approach seeks therefore to strike a balance between punishing the offender and 
making sure that the offender is supported. The method to achieving this is by 
incorporating not only offenders and victims but also their communities with the 
goal of seeking accountability for the crimes and at the same time reuniting the 
communities divided by the violence. In this way both parts gain some type of 
closure. The demands are obviously high, since the method must meet both the 
needs of the victims and the needs of offenders at the same time as they take their 
responsibility for crimes committed (Forget in Prager & Govier (ed), 2003:199f).  
On the other hand, the supporters of the more traditional retributive justice 
approach questions whether restorative justice can bear the weight of more serious 
crimes. Some offenders and/or victims can be favored on basis of ethnic 
background, political allegiance or gender (Bloomfield et al, 2003:113). The 
retributive justice camp argue therefore that for justice to be made and for 
potential reconciliation, this type of justice is the best suitable to limit the 
ethnically and politically motivated violence that can erupt after civil war. This is 
important because if violence erupts again the first step of reconciliation, the 
prospects for co-existence, may worsen (Bloomfield et al, 2003:98). Using 
traditional criminal trials will also bring about the potential of not only preventing 
future violations of human rights but also satisfy the victims and eventually 
prevent them from taking the law into their own hands (Theissen, 2004:3).  
Obviously this type of approach does not incorporate the whole community but 
this does not have to be a downside since individualizing guilt can lead to 
avoiding what might be a dangerous perception about the whole community 
(Bloomfield et al, 2003:98). In the case of Kosovo this would mean that the whole 
Serb community or Albanian community would be held responsible for the acts of 
few individuals.  
Prosecution of criminals and especially war crimes has also a democratic 
value in itself since it may instill confidence in the post-conflict institutions. 
Failing to prosecute criminals may only resurrect the cycle of impunity that 
constitutes injustices and threatens peace. In situations such as Kosovo, where the 
minority has gone from an oppressed minority to being the dominating majority in 
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 a new state formation, the international ad hoc criminal tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia may be an opportunity to help build confidence in a shared future 
(Bloomfield et al, 2003:100). It is believed that by having war crimes tried by a 
neutral third party it will help build a society based on the law and not on 
impunity or revenge. Another condition within justice and the rule of law is the 
reparation of physical conditions for the safe return of refugees’. Barry Hart has 
emphasized this in his study of reconciliation efforts in Bosnia by finding that 
many refugees were reluctant to return to their homes because of an unsafe 
environment both physically and politically (Hart in Abu-Nimer (ed), 2001:296).  
I believe that it is not necessarily so that these approaches must be in conflict 
with one another, but depending on the context one may consider seeking to apply 
both these approaches by separating the offenders in categories. Those that are 
deemed as instigators’ of violence would be the subject of the retributive approach 
and those minor offenders would be the subject of a restorative approach. 
Regardless of the gains and losses with each approach one must take into account 
the delicacy of the local context in where these approaches will be applied since 
they have a significant impact on reconciliation and ultimately peace. 
The concept of peace is just as difficult to conceptualize but for the purpose of 
this study the concept of positive peace will be applied. Positive peace is the view 
that peace is when all types of violence have seized to exist. This conceptualizing 
includes the seizure of violence that occurs on all levels and settings, including 
indirect violence that might reduce the opportunity to enjoy human rights.  John 
Galtung defines positive peace as “[…] the capacity to deal with conflict 
nonviolently and creatively” (Galtung in Abu-Nimer, 2001:3). When peace on the 
other hand is of term as negative peace it strictly indicates the absence of violence 
(Ibid). Having outlined some of the key conceptualizations needed to clear out the 
theoretical jungle that often is the case with complex terms I must stress that each 
of the terms outlined above are interdependent of one another and there is truly no 
direct predetermined path towards reconciliation or a roadmap one can use in any 
case. It is my belief that I have outlined the fundamental dilemmas of 
reconciliation and stressed the importance of justice, peace and coexistence. 
1.3 Analytical framework 
The analytical framework is intended to provide for an instrument of measure 
covering broad areas of society and based on the theory and concepts that will 
have a direct impact on the prospect of reconciliation. The choice to analyze only 
dimensions on a broad society level is made for reasons outlined in the statement 
of this thesis and the theoretical background that argues for an integrated 
framework including not only justice, the respect for human rights and rule of law 
but also coexistence and civil society in building a base and prospect for 
reconciliation.  
Each dimension will start with a brief discussion on its possible implications 
in the context of Kosovo and will end with questions that I will pose when 
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 seeking to address successes and failures in the areas. Obviously these dimensions 
are seemingly also very much important for the culture of democracy in Kosovo. 
1.3.1 Coexistence and integration 
Coexistence and integration as a first dimension is highly central in determining 
why ethnically motivated acts of violence are still very much a reality in Kosovo. 
This dimension might in itself serve to give crucial answers since, as outlined in 
the theoretical background; it is the first step to reconciliation. Coexistence is 
defined as the possibility of members of the Kosovo Albanian community and the 
Kosovo Serb community living together without resorting to violence against one 
another. This is termed as the minimalistic perspective of coexistence. 
Nonetheless, coexistence takes on a broader understanding than that of the 
minimalistic perspective in my thesis since other aspects in society can help 
facilitate coexistence, such as the equality in economic position, political power 
etc constituting a sense of mutual respect and tolerance (Kriesberg in Abu-Nimer, 
2001:48).  
“Coexistence means to exist together, in conjunction with, at the same time, in 
the same place with another” (Weiner, 1998:14). How, then, can coexistence be 
measured and examined? We can look at the degree of integration of Serbs in 
post-conflict Kosovo and the degree of imposition, meaning what degree the 
imposing of relationships has reached (Kriesberg in Abu-Nimer, 2001:49). For 
example, if the integration level is moderate and the imposition level is mixed and 
moderate then we can expect to see some type of domination and segregation. 
Obviously this situation may shift since any change in context, be that political or 
social, may affect coexistence (Kriesberg in Abu-Nimer, 2001:50ff).  
In sum, when addressing this question in the context of Kosovo I will be 
looking into the degree of integration in political institutions and integration 
society-wide of the Kosovo Serb minority. I will also be addressing why and what 
hinders coexistence in Kosovo.  Interesting here is also to reflect upon the effect 
of the disputed political status of Kosovo on coexistence and integration. 
1.3.2 Rule of Law and justice 
The second but nonetheless just as important dimension that I will be using to 
explain the failure to establish a base for reconciliation in Kosovo is the rule of 
law and justice. I have already addressed justice and its general implications on 
reconciliation in the theoretical background but will here present what I will be 
looking at specifically in the terrain. The rule of law is defined in a minimalistic 
form as when all laws in a society are fairly applied by relevant state institutions 
and the judiciary. In strict form it means that no one should be above the law 
(O’Donnell in Diamond & Morlino (ed), 2005:7f). The legal system in Kosovo 
should therefore make sure that political and civil rights are respected.  
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 Especially interesting in our context is to look at the degree of confidence in 
the judiciary, the general performance of courts and police and the measures taken 
to assure the safe return of refugees. An important feature of this dimension is 
also the making of justice after the violent conflict in Kosovo and the prosecution 
of war crimes will be at heart here. Are war crimes prosecuted? What type of 
justice is being applied in prosecuting such crimes? Retributive or restorative 
justice? What is the general security situation in Kosovo? Are the minorities 
integrated in the security and other rule of law sectors? Are the physical damages 
subject to reparation? As seen here some of the questions in the dimension cut 
through that of questions of coexistence and integration and this is the nature of 
all dimensions since they are interdependent of one another.  
1.3.3 Civil society and participation 
The role of NGOs and civil society in general is crucial to the process of 
reconciliation by having the opportunity to activate a greater part of the 
population. It can help provide popular support for peace and reconciliation 
among the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority in Kosovo. In addition 
NGOs are often believed to be more effective than state actors since they act on a 
grass-root level, typically not constrained by any mandates and can create an 
arena in where people meet, organized and interact with one another (Orjuela, 
2003:196).  
NGOs close proximity to the people gives it the possibility, if active, to create 
social capital and sustain trust and cooperation effectively bridging ethnic, 
religious and cultural divisions (Orjuela, 2003:197). The role of civil society is 
therefore also closely connected to that of the rule of law, coexistence and 
integration. Grassroots reconciliation work can take the form of lobbying 
governments to address injustices and inform the public of projects undertaken to 
improve citizens’ standards of living.  For instance, the reparation of property 
destroyed can foster trust and coexistence if the people on the local level are 
involved in the reparations. These practical steps that NGO:s can undertake or 
assist are well suitable in difficult political and ethnical contexts such as that of 
Kosovo. Even though they don’t directly aim at reconciling the parties they 
provide for a neutral ground (Theissen 2004:9f). This is especially suitable since 
the mere word of reconciliation is quite charged in Kosovo and may pose 
difficulties in engaging former adversaries’ in the process (Bloomfield et al, 
2003:25). 
1.4 Methodology 
This thesis is guided by a method best suitable to its purposes, that is to say a 
single country case study with merits such as the ability to find concrete specifics 
in one case rather than abstract and insufficient findings while studying many 
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 cases (Merriam, 1994:27). Obviously there are different types of case studies. My 
study is a heuristic case study, with the intention to create new understandings 
and/or confirm my theoretical stand (Ibid). On the other hand this method will 
make it utterly difficult to draw generalizations of the findings; nonetheless one 
should not undermine the importance of this method since it may result in 
hypotheses for possible testing in future studies. This qualitative approach is 
chosen since it is highly suitable for those interested in understanding and 
explaining processes (Merriam, 1994:33). This study is of a theory-consuming 
nature with the ambition of using existing theories to explain and understand in 
depth the specifics in one case (Esaisasson et al, 2004:40).  
1.5 Material  
This thesis will entirely consist of documents, defined broadly as written material 
such as rapports, especially suitable for case studies (Merriam, 1994: 117). This 
means that my material will be of secondary nature and will therefore affect my 
results. It is imperative that I in my usage of these secondary documents use some 
guidelines that will filter out unsuitable material (Esaiasson et al, 2004:303). The 
most important aspect is that the author or organization that has brought about the 
rapport is independent and that the rapport is consistent with the purpose of this 
thesis. In practical terms this means that I will be eliminating rapports that come 
from authors or organizations with ethnically based interests of portraying the 
situation in Kosovo in a subjective manner. Albanian or Serbian material will 
therefore be entirely excluded from this thesis.  
1.6 Limitations and disposition 
This thesis will focus primarily on the relationship between the majority 
Albanians and minority Serbs. The most direct and obvious reason for this is the 
fact that these two groups are the largest ethnic groups and primary actors in the 
recent violent conflict in Kosovo.  
The study will start with a background account of the conflict in Kosovo; I 
have chosen to set the starting point of this account on Milosevic coming to power 
and the end point when UNMIK was established. I do this because this time 
period covers a period of high explanatory value in finding initial obstacles to 
reconciliation. I then move on with the reconciliation efforts in Kosovo and the 
challenges faced with bringing together Kosovo’s divided communities.  
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 2 Conflict Background: Obstacles to 
reconciliation? 
Kosovo is a landlocked territory bordering Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and 
Macedonia1. It has approximately 2 million inhabitants of which around 10% are 
believed to be Serbs. It unilaterally declared independence on the 17th of February 
2008 from the Republic of Serbia after talks aimed at resolving its political status 
had failed. The self-proclaimed republic of Kosovo has been recognized by most 
western powers and has up to date received forty-one official recognitions. Its 
independence is fiercely opposed by Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo is yet 
under significant international administration and is expected to take over the 
responsibilities of UNMIK on the 15th of June 20082.  
There is most certainly a need to have a closer look of Kosovo’s history if I 
am to be able to accurately determine the initial obstacles of reconciliation in 
Kosovo and the more recent failure to set the stage for such a process. Not very 
much is known about Kosovo prior to the 14th century. What is known is that a 
massive battle occurred on the Kosovo fields, located roughly in the centre of 
present-day Kosovo. This battle holds significant importance to Kosovo Serbs 
since Serbian forces; interestingly enough fighting alongside Albanians lost the 
battle against Ottoman forces in 1389 (Malcolm, 1998:61). The region would 
remain under Ottoman rule for nearly 500 years. Year 1912 marks another date of 
explanatory importance. The Ottoman rule ended, Serbia and Albania evolved as 
independent nations and present day Kosovo with a sizeable Albanian population 
was put under Serbian control (Malcolm, 1998:257).  
What follows next is a period of communist rule under Tito and Yugoslavia 
which is in itself important but since this thesis purpose is not to give a full 
historical account of every time phase up to the situation of present-day Kosovo I 
will move on to more recent historical periods that have been deemed as the prime 
causes of division in Kosovo and subsequently outright war. The transition starts 
when Milosevic comes to power and Yugoslavia begins to crumble. What follows 
after have been overshadowed by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia but is crucial to 
understanding the current situation in Kosovo on a society level and the 
animosities between the Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Please see appendix for a geographic overview of Kosovo. 
2 For a further and more detailed account of the recent and present situation in Kosovo the reader is referred to 
BBCs Country profile and compilation of articles: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3524092.stm  
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 2.1 Milosevic Era 1989-1997: A legacy of apartheid 
When Tito, the long time dictator of Yugoslavia died, the power was up for grabs 
and the one to succeed the best was Slobodan Milosevic. He frequently visited 
Kosovo to rally support for him, portraying the situation of Serbs in Kosovo as a 
threat to the whole nation of Serbia (Vickers, 1998:227f). He was given a hero’s 
welcome because up to that moment few from Belgrade ever went down to 
Kosovo. He would also hold a famous speech commemorating the battle of 1389 
and marking the start of what would be the breakup of Yugoslavia.  
He addressed a crowd of nearly half a million Serbs with these words:  
“Today, six centuries later, we are again fighting battles, they are not armed 
battles although such things cannot yet be excluded”(Vickers, 1998:239).  
Here he clearly indicated that the constitutional arrangements that gave 
Kosovo significant autonomy would be removed and effectively sending no hope 
of reconciliation for the Albanians (Ibid). While marking the 600th anniversary of 
the battle, portraying the threat towards Serbia and indicating that war was ahead, 
what Milosevic essentially did was make nationalistic sentiments and myths a 
reality that could be felt and suffered (Kühle & Laustsen, 2006:19). Using myths 
gave Milosevic the opportunity to portray a morally superior “Serbdom” being 
threatened by barbaric Albanians (Kühle & Laustsen, 2006:20-31). This is an 
aspect that in some regards has been inherited to the present day Kosovo, making 
reconciliation utterly difficult. For the pessimist this can pose the question of 
whether peace and reconciliation of people who see themselves as historical 
enemies is possible at all (Ibid). Being an optimist, one might instead argue that 
some myths and stereotypes are there to be broken down, they can be creatively 
altered to benefit coexistence and that, as clearly indicated in the theoretical 
background, reconciliation itself facilitates a process for the removal of collective 
guilt and stereotypes. 
By the beginning of 1990 Belgrade had removed Kosovo’s autonomy and 
prohibited the provincial parliament from holding meetings. During this time an 
emergency administration was imposed and soon after mass dismissals of 
Albanians was speeded up. No single part of everyday life was left unaffected by 
these moves as Albanian media, culture and health care was placed under 
emergency management effectively leaving the Albanian majority in Kosovo 
isolated (Vickers, 1998:244ff). Soon the Albanian and Serbian communities were 
living without any communication and in an apartheid situation. This would 
eventually lead to a phase of civil resistance in Kosovo. This was a strategic move 
since the Albanians in Kosovo were militarily weaker (Clark, 2000:64). Kosovo 
Albanians created parallel institutions that effectively divided Serbs and 
Albanians into two distinct political communities. The segregation of this time 
cemented prejudice between Serbs and Albanians since there was not much to say 
or do that would counter youngsters’ experience of Serbs as abusers and 
privileged (Clark, 2000:104). While the Serbs were attending the regular schools 
and benefiting from the educational system the Albanians secretly organized 
education in home-settings and some argued at this time that the parallel 
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 structures only amounted to a deepening of hatred between the two communities 
(Ibid). During this time the Albanians also organized parallel elections, elected a 
parliament, declared the sovereign “Republic of Kosova” and elected a President 
that would be the front figure of the non-violent resistance to Serbian oppression. 
The front figure, the now late President Ibrahim Rugova managed to retain 
support to his non-violent strategy for around seven years but the lack of 
improvement and international recognition of the human rights abuses occurring 
in Kosovo at this time undermined his credibility among the Kosovo Albanians 
(Vickers, 1998:298). The hope had been that the Dayton negotiations in 1995 
would include a solution to the situation in Kosovo but that was not the case 
(Ibid). Radical forces grew as a result of this and the Kosovo Liberation Army 
was formed.   
2.2 War breaks out 1997-1999 
 
In November 1997 the resistance against Serb oppression in Kosovo that had so 
far been non-violent entered a new phase. The KLA attacked Serbian police 
offices and soon could claim to have killed 21 police officers (Clark, 2000:172). 
Soon after, Serbian authorities initiated the build-up of military and paramilitary 
forces to respond to the increasing threat that KLA posed. In these counter actions 
there were grave atrocities committed that came to serve as a recruitment 
incentive for Kosovo Albanians and many joined the ranks of the KLA (Clark, 
200:173). As expected the violence escalated and would also create different 
symbols than that of the nonviolent period of resistance, it created martyrs and 
national heroes for the Kosovo Albanians of what the Kosovo Serbs considered to 
be terrorists. Western leaders declared that they needed to prevent the 
humanitarian situation from getting worse and after peace talks in Rambouillet in 
France failed, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched a bombing 
campaign on 24 March that would last for 78-days (Judah, 2002:237-256).  After 
the bombing, Kosovo Albanian refugees expelled during the conflict returned to 
their home and the coin was now flipped.  
“Just as the policy makers underestimated the Serb will to expel or encourage 
the flight of as much of the Kosovar population as possible, they now 
underestimated the unrelenting thirst for revenge amongst the Albanians returning 
home” (Judah, 2002:286)  
The violent conflict that erupted would therefore as one might expect, serve to 
be another facilitator of division amongst the two ethnic groups. The 
consequences of Kosovo’s violent background meant that any mission or attempt 
to establish any kind of base for the reconciliation between Kosovo Albanians and 
Kosovo Serbs would most definitely be difficult considering that the two 
communities had been divided by more than ten years of segregation and 
violence. Any attempt for sustainable peace would have to establish the 
reunification of the society in Kosovo.  
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 3 UNMIK: Responsibilities and tasks 
of the international presence in Kosovo? 
It is highly relevant to give a thorough account of the international presence in 
Kosovo since the mission established in Kosovo in 1999 is of such a nature never 
performed before by the United Nations. The missions’ responsibilities and tasks 
are motivated by a desire to achieve sustainable peace in Kosovo (Söbjerg in 
Knudsen & Laustsen (ed), 2006:71f). The International presence in Kosovo was 
established with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 after NATO forces 
intervened and Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo. The implementation of 
resolution 1244 is coordinated by three main international organizations, UN, 
OSCE and EU. The umbrella organization UNMIK consists of extensive 
responsibilities and tasks. Resolution 1244 provided for the establishment of an 
interim administration “[...]which will provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo”3.  
Within the umbrella organization UNMIK, the OSCE Mission is to train locals 
and strive for the building and strengthening of institutions. Its work is to “[…]be 
guided by the importance of bringing about mutual respect and reconciliation 
among all ethnic groups in Kosovo and of establishing a viable multi-ethnic 
society where the rights of each citizen are fully and equally respected”4. UNMIK 
has generally used top-down approaches in order to promote reconciliation 
(Johnsson, 2004:25). The goal is to include the Serb minority in democratic 
institutions and security forces. Minorities are offered privileged political 
participation by reserved seats in the parliament which would guarantee far more 
seats than would be the case considering the demographic position of Serbs in 
Kosovo (Hysa in Newman & Rich, 2004:290). In the mandate of OSCE there is 
absolutely nothing that indicates on how reconciliation should be reached in 
Kosovo and it appears that work on reconciliation is seen as part of the 
strengthening of human rights and multiethnic society. Equally UNMIKs mandate 
does not express any strategy for reaching responsibility for the acts of violence or 
the facilitating of relationships on the grass-root level (Johnsson, 2004:26).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 For the full version of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 the reader is advised to visit: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement  
4 For the full version of the OSCE Permanent Council decision 305 the reader is advised to visit: 
http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/1999/07/2577_en.pdf  
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 3.1 Failure to establish a base for the process of 
reconciliation in Kosovo 
Despite the establishment of UNMIK and its ambitious goals we have seen a 
recurrence of ethnically motivated acts of violence. The continued existence of 
enclaves, the mars 2004 riots and recently the violence after the unilateral 
declaration of independence are all painful reminders of the lack of reconciliation 
in Kosovo. The distrust and segregation that met the international presence in 
Kosovo is sadly enough still a reality in Kosovo.  
Obviously UNMIK has had considerable success in constructing a system of 
political participation that is highly important in promoting reconciliation but 
justice, accountability for crimes, reparation and participation in other segments of 
society are interestingly enough missing (Johnsson, 2004:48). UNMIK cannot 
solely be held responsible for the lack of progress on reconciliation and hopefully 
the analysis below will shed some further light on the reasons for the failure to 
create a base for reconciliation in Kosovo. 
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 4 Analysis: Why has there been a 
failure to establish a base for the process 
of reconciliation in Kosovo?  
4.1 Coexistence and integration 
Coexistence is not a reality in Kosovo. Integration of Serbs was a success in some 
areas of society with the creation of the Kosovo Police Force that included almost 
10% Kosovo Serbs, but when Kosovo declared independence around 300 Serb 
police officers left their jobs refusing to work for an independent Kosovo5. One 
third of the ethnic Serbs live in northern Kosovo while the remaining live in the 
south which is dominated by ethnic Albanians. Most of the Serb minority is 
concentrated in enclaves and have ever since the end of the conflict lacked 
freedom of movement (Teutsch, 2005:26). Prior to the declaration of 
independence the only real integration Serbs had in these enclaves was that of 
Serbian police officers working alongside Albanian police officers.  
Coexistence is not only hindered by divisions about the political status of 
Kosovo but also because of the security situation. Even though NATO had 
success in forcing Milosevic and Serb forces to retreat, it could not prevent the 
retribution against the Kosovo Serbs when Albanians returned to their homes. 
Serbs are considered to have been collaborators of the Milosevic and prior 
oppressive Serb regimes and were soon after the war ended victims of Albanian 
atrocities (Teutsch, 2005:23). Violence against the Serb minority has ever since 
continued even though with a lower intensity. Fear of harassment and 
provocations has led to the creation of Serb parallel structures in many aspects of 
daily life (OSCE, 2003:31). This means that in some areas Serbs do not leave their 
enclaves for essential services and are effectively isolated. Since these parallel 
structures are mostly situated in the north of the river Ibar in Mitrovica the Serb 
minority in the south of Kosovo is still in need of protection while travelling 
through Kosovo to benefit from these parallel structures. Obviously the threat of 
ethnic violence in Kosovo is of threat for the whole region since Belgrade 
continues to have a say in the lives of ethnic Serbs being the prime financial and 
political supporter of parallel structures in Kosovo.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 The Christian Science Monitor 2008: Independence Strains Kosovo’s Police Force (31 March). Please see: 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0331/p04s01-woeu.html  
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 Division between the ethnic Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo is also reflected 
in the views of what the factors to hampering coexistence and integration are. In a 
survey conducted by UNDP in 2003, the majority of Albanians related the cause 
to tense relations between Serbs and Albanians simply to a lack of readiness of 
Serbs for integration (UNDP, 2003:20).  On the other hand, Serbs view the efforts 
of Albanians for the integration of Serbs as insufficient (Ibid). The failure to 
integrate Kosovo Serbs in the society is not only the result of the two communities 
living separate for almost nine years but by the fact that few Serbs know the 
Albanian language and the younger generation of Albanians don’t know Serbian.  
Tensions between the Albanian and Serb communities in Kosovo culminated 
in March 2004 after three young Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar river. The 
river serves as a physical line of division between the two communities and 
allegedly the boys had been chased into the river by Serbs (Human Rights Watch, 
2004:19). What followed after were inflammatory reports by local media of how 
ruthless the Serbs had been and it set the stage for protests and attacks against the 
Serb minority across Kosovo (Human Rights Watch, 2004:20). The clashes led to 
the death of more than eight Serbs, hundreds injured, homes were burned down 
and sites of high cultural significance to the Serbs were vandalized and destroyed 
(Teutsch, 2005:25). Most importantly these violent acts contributed to low 
confidence in the security forces ability to offer the secure environment that is 
needed for coexistence to be able to exist. There were many cases where the 
international security presence and local police failed to prevent violent acts and 
in some cases didn’t even show the intention to do so (Human rights Watch, 
2004:22f). Regaining the confidence of all communities in Kosovo is therefore 
crucial to coexistence.  
Interestingly enough the ethnic Albanians face similar problems in security, 
freedom of movement and lack of confidence in institutions that provide for their 
well-being. The Kosovo Albanians may pose a majority in the whole of Kosovo 
but there are some areas where they are subject to minority status and problems. 
The northern region of Kosovo and specifically northern Mitrovica is the home of 
a sizeable Albanian minority. They too are subject to extensive harassment and 
intimidation (Teutsch, 2005:28). Since the communities live isolated from one 
another afraid of the consequences of leaving the enclaves it is no wonder that 
reconciliation looks far away. When there is restricted freedom of movement then 
the issue of coexistence holds a secondary importance since existing at all 
becomes an everyday struggle. These restrictions have repercussions on the 
possibility to generate income and meeting basic needs (UNHCR, 2006:6).  In 
order to review the achievements and failures in the rebuilding of Kosovo a 
review mechanism was established. The Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide was given 
the task of reporting his findings to the Security Council.  His findings are 
interesting in determining why we see a failure to create a firm base for 
reconciliation since he addresses important factors such as a conflict among 
identities. On the one hand the Kosovo Albanians try to form their own identity 
but on the other hand they come in direct conflict to that of the Kosovo Serb 
interests of preserving their identity from assimilation (Eide, 2005:7). One must 
therefore acknowledge that the shift of power, from being under the rule of 
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 Belgrade to being ruled by Pristina is a difficult transition for the Serbs. 
Obviously this is interesting in the sense that perceived and not only real threats 
are factors that hinder coexistence.  
UNMIK has through its institutional arrangements tried to smooth the 
progress towards coexistence and reconciliation. Creating a sphere for peaceful 
political deliberation has apparently had little effect on the ground. Critics to this 
top-down approach argue that integration into politics is not the right way forward 
and other factors that affect the everyday life of Serbs should be addressed6. The 
return process is also a factor that most definitely affects the prospects for 
coexistence. This process suffered a major setback with the March 2004 violence. 
This is still an open wound and without addressing the wounds of the past it is not 
surprising that reconciliation might seem unachievable. It is acknowledged that 
inter-ethnic reconciliation in Kosovo cannot be achieved without providing 
security, respecting property rights but also promoting return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons. Achieving this creates the foundation for a multi-
ethnic society and this has unfortunately not been achieved in Kosovo (Eide, 
2005:14).  
The return process has been very slow. Members of the Kosovo Serb 
community feared revenge attacks from Kosovo Albanians and fled to the 
neighboring countries after the war in 1999 and most of them have yet to return. 
The return process is obviously very important since coexistence would require 
the return of the other part in order to coexist. Only 12 400 out of the believed 
65 000 that have fled had by 2005 found it secure to return to their homes 
(Teutsch, 2005:30). The methods used in trying to promote the return of refugees 
have been concentrated on the physical reparation of damaged property and 
financial incentives of up to 2 000 Euros for those that return. Clearly this has not 
had success because it is not a long term solution to the process of return. The 
long term solution would be securing access to vital services and protecting 
property rights. In order to succeed one must also direct considerable attention to 
the remaining minorities; attention must focus on the sustainability of the Serb 
community since those that return will most probably return in areas where they 
are not utterly outnumbered by Kosovo Albanians and where they can find 
services being available (Eide, 2005:15).   
Some argue that the failure to secure peaceful coexistence and reconcile the 
two communities can be explained by characteristics in the Albanian culture. It is 
argued that the culture of revenge is the reason why Kosovo is segregated. This 
culture, coded in the traditional Kanuni i Lek Dukagjinit and based on customary 
law prescribes the use of violence to revenge a killed relative or someone under 
ones care (Johnsson, 2004:59). One must first and foremost clearly state that these 
are old traditions and part of a code of conduct that is banned. The Kanuni is also 
much more than a roadmap to achieving justice by revenge. It is based on four 
qualities that ethnic Albanians view as part of their identity and on the contrary to 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (March 2008), Forgotten World: Kosovo Enclaves, please see: 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/1st%20mission%20to%20Serb%20enclaves%20in%20Kosovo,%20report.doc  
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 that of revenge, these qualities are more widely embraced. These qualities, which 
consist of honour, hospitality, right conduct and loyalty to one’s clan, can all be 
used effectively to promote coexistence and reconciliation (Clark, 2000:32). 
Equally the Serbs attach their identity in Kosovo to cultural and religious aspects 
that can be used to build confidence between the communities. In order to do this, 
sites of high cultural and religious value must be protected (Eide, 2005:16). 
Secure access and protection for these sites would help not only sustain the Serb 
community in Kosovo but also indicate the seriousness of the Kosovo leadership 
to promoting sustained coexistence and setting the ground for reconciliation.  
4.2 Rule of Law and justice 
Having established that the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs live in two 
distinct spheres separated from one another as a result of the lack of security, 
freedom of movement and lack of initiatives to promote coexistence, another 
important dimension is the question of rule of law and justice after violent 
conflict. In short, the importance of addressing the past for a better future. 
Peaceful coexistence is vital to rebuilding trust among the Kosovo Albanian and 
Kosovo Serb community but understandably just as vital is the re-establishment of 
the rule of law and the prosecution of crimes.  
Judicial institutions and the rule of law are key in helping people begin their 
needed memory work in dealing with the traumas of ethnic violence. This was 
especially difficult in Kosovo since with the departure of Serb forces and 
authority the judicial system was practically inexistent7. As noted in the 
theoretical background some kind of retributive justice is necessary if the victims 
are not to be left with revenge as their only means of justice. It is believed that a 
part of the answers to why human rights abuses are still very much common in 
Kosovo can be found in the weak judicial system (Human Rights Watch, February 
2008:1). The general security situation in Kosovo contributes to the weakness of 
the judicial system since public and especially physical access to courts remains 
highly problematic. This is especially true in the divided city of Mitrovica were 
access to courts remains severely limited.  
The violence that erupted on March 2004 would come to be a crucial test to 
the functioning of justice in Kosovo. It is reported that only half of the arrested 
suspects of violence and inciting hatred have been tried (Human Rights Watch, 
March 2008:7). The lack of justice in Kosovo may also explain why the Serb 
minority is incapable of integration. Confidence in the judicial system is very 
difficult to build if crimes are not punishable. Confidence is also negatively 
affected by a fact that the punishment given have been hardly expected since 
many were given very lenient sentences. This is explained by weak evidence but 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 Amnesty International (January 2008),  The Challenge to fix a failed UN Justice Mission in Kosovo, please 
see: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/001/2008/en/EUR700012008en.html  
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 also by the unsecure situation that national and international prosecutors have to 
work in, being the target of threats and other forms of intimidations (Human 
Rights Watch, March 2008:16).  
Another failure in the dimension of rule of law and justice is that there has 
been few prosecutions of war crimes. This is especially crucial in explaining why 
there essentially has been a problem to create trust, coexistence and paving the 
road to reconciliation. Amnesty International has found that impunity for war 
crimes continues. From 1999 to 2006 there were only 23 prosecutions for war 
crimes (Amnesty International, 2006:5). Questions over impartiality also 
contribute to the failure of the judicial system. Many trials of Serbs accused of 
war crimes against Albanians have had to be retried by international judges since 
the Albanian judges were considered to be unsatisfactorily impartial (Ibid). 
Similarly there has been no prosecution of members of Albanian armed groups 
that have been suspected of abducting members of the Serb community (Amnesty 
International, 2006:6).  
Another major explanation to why we see such problems in the judicial system 
is that the system still, some years after the conflict, suffers from a shortage of 
judges and prosecutors. The cases are many but the personnel to few to deal with 
the overload of cases. In addition to this, those that are charged with the difficult 
tasks of bringing about justice lack the qualifications and experience needed 
(Teutsch, 2005:33). The inefficiency of the judicial system can be the source of 
insecurity and deteriorate confidence in the system that could lead to the straining 
of interethnic relations.  The inability of the judicial system to resolve cases 
involving major offences in a limited timeframe has also shown to affect the 
Kosovo Police Force that up to recently has been rare example of cooperation and 
progress in interethnic relations. The police force is affected simply by having to 
work in an environment where people are less afraid of the consequences of their 
actions (UNDP, 2003:25).  
Furthermore, UNMIK has been criticized for looking to international interests 
instead of local interests for not establishing a war crimes court that would 
address serious human rights abuses. Concentration of international prosecutors 
and judges has been on combating organized crime and corruption8. Combating 
organized crime and corruption is in itself irrefutably important for the rule of law 
but does little to bring closure to the many victims of Kosovo’s recent bloody 
history. This brings us to one of the dilemmas in reconciliation and justice. In 
2007 Ramush Haradinaj, then the prime minister of Kosovo and former guerilla 
commander, was charged by the UN tribunal in The Hague with killing 40 people 
during the conflict in 1998. The prosecution of Mr. Haradinaj was deemed to 
create instability in Kosovo and the prosecution was therefore resisted by 
international officials in Kosovo. Haradinaj was seen to have contributed to the 
easing of tensions between the Serb and Albanian communities and because of his 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8 Amnesty International (January 2008),  The Challenge to fix a failed UN Justice Mission in Kosovo, please 
see: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/001/2008/en/EUR700012008en.html 
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 background as a freedom fighter no Albanian was thought to able to accuse him of 
betrayal when trying to integrate the Serbs as part of the society9. 
Retributive justice in this sense may send the signal that all parties of the 
conflict are subject to the law but apparently in some cases, charging crucial 
individuals with war crimes is seen as a destabilizing factor rather than as 
confidence building. International justice through the war crimes tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia is probably highly important considering the deficiencies of 
the national criminal court system in Kosovo. Nonetheless the work of the 
international tribune is seen by the Kosovo Serbs as a method of punishing the 
Kosovo Serbs rather than achieving justice (Kühle & Laustsen in Knudsen & 
Laustsen (ed), 2006:32). In this regard only 32 percent of the Serbs supported 
cooperation with the court (Ibid). However the perception of the tribunal may be, 
the international judicial measures undertaken by the tribunal are aimed at 
reaching three crucial goals. The goals include bringing those guilty of crimes to 
answer for them, stabilizing peace by individualizing guilt in opposition to the 
collective guilt that reinforces hatred and ultimately building a base that helps 
contribute to reconciliation between the two communities (Fatic, 2000:1). As long 
as the judicial system in Kosovo is incapable of punishing war crimes the 
necessity of the international tribunal to take on this role will remain high.  
Another question that is to be addressed in this dimension of the analysis is 
whether restorative justice, the quest to restore the injuries that victims have 
suffered, has been applied. This question is highly related to the return processes 
and issues concerning housing and property. As long as such issues are not 
resolved the parties in the conflict continue to be victimized. The Kosovo 
Property Agency was created with the purpose to solve these property issues. 
Despite some initial success the activity of the Kosovo Property Agency was 
significantly hindered by the lack of funding. As a result of this in the last year the 
agency has not been able to implement any of the decisions it issued on the claims 
(KPA, 2008:8). This is believed to be evident threat to the rule of law, general 
security situation and the return of refugees (KPA, 2008:9f).  
One must acknowledge that even if the KPA had managed to implement any 
of the property claims the displaced persons claiming the property would have to 
feel secure enough to repossess their property. The security situation has been an 
obstacle that often has lead to the property being looted and reoccupied because 
the rightful owner has not been able to return. The existence of enclaves was 
touched upon as a factor that explained the failure to establish coexistence 
between the two communities but it also explains problems with restoring justice 
because leaving the enclaves is filled with uncertainty10. The situation of the rule 
of law and justice for the now independent Kosovo remains obviously gloomy. 
One must consider the fact that in such a small territory where violent acts in one 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 International Herald Tribune (April 8, 2007): Kosovo war crimes trial splits West and prosecutors, please see: 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/08/news/kosovo.php  
10 World Politics Review (04 december 2007): Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo still lack freedom of movement, 
please see: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1405  
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 area rapidly are known and spread to other areas. It increases therefore the 
importance of prosecuting crimes since giving the perception that freedom of 
movement for the offender is tolerated then it will be no surprise that that the 
victim does not enjoy the same freedom.  
When UNMIK thins down its mission in Kosovo to adapt to the new situation 
on the ground it is apparent that the above issues must be addressed. The fact that 
the EU is to launch a specific Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, termed EULEX11, 
is a further indication that the judicial system in Kosovo is in a critically weak 
position to facilitate any kind of reconciliation process and needs urgent support. 
4.3 Civil society and participation 
The development of civil society has for the purpose of this thesis been at heart 
since it is one of the most crucial components of Lederach integrated theoretical 
framework for sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. It is also the aspect 
that has the potential to incorporate the two communities in the work for a better 
future towards dialogue, trust and eventually reconciliation. The NGO sector in 
Kosovo is almost synonymous with civil society in Kosovo (Claussen, 2006:15). 
The activity or inactivity of NGOs in Kosovo has therefore the potential to 
explain why we see a failure to bridge ethnic divisions in Kosovo. 
Civil society in Kosovo gained substance during the non-violent resistance 
phase in Kosovo but did not much to foster cooperation between the Kosovo 
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Most of the NGO:s active at this time were 
organizations supported by the majority public that essentially were advocacy 
organizations for independence (Claussen, 2006:10). During this time the Kosovo 
Albanians flocked to be active members of these organizations while the Kosovo 
Serbs coupled to state institutions. After the war and the establishment of UNMIK 
civil society boomed in Kosovo and more than 2000 NGO:s were formed (UNDP, 
2005:4). As a result of this many Kosovars12 view NGO:s with suspicion and 
associate it with groups of individuals that are well paid and drive expensive cars 
(KIPRED, 2005:4). This is also shown by surveys where NGOs are ranked lower 
than political parties on basis of trust (ibid). Nevertheless the strengthening of 
civil society is particularly crucial in Kosovo because of the remoteness of some 
rural areas and the inability for some to reach the institutions of Kosovo, due to 
security issues. NGO:s can in this situation assist and be a crossing bridge for 
those isolated groups (UNDP, 2005:4). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 EULEX is the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, it is expected to launch after the 
constitution of The Republic of Kosovo comes into force.  It is stated that the goal of the mission is to” support 
the Kosovo authorities in their efforts to build a sustainable and functional Rule of Law system” Until then, 
UNMIK will retain full operational responsibilities. It is clearly stated that EULEX Kosovo will not replace 
UNMIK and the successor of UNMIK will be the Kosovo institutions. For more info, please see: 
http://www.eupt-kosovo.eu/new/index.php?id=1  
12 Kosovar is used as a term when referring to all communities in Kosovo 
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 The problem is though that many of the NGOs in Kosovo are a type of 
hybrids, they are funded by international organizations but managed and staffed 
by locals and this has the effect of essentially creating NGO:s that base their local 
strategies on the policy goals of their funders (KIPRED, 2005:11). Integration, 
coexistence and the strengthening of the rule of law is obviously a long-term 
objective but work on these areas are difficult since much of the funding is on 
short-term projects and when the money run dry so do the projects (KIPRED, 
2005:12f). This creates severe problems for the sustainability and most certainly 
for NGO:s accountability (Claussen, 2006:12). If NGO:s are to provide popular 
support for peace and reconciliation among the two communities they most 
definitely need not be accountable to primarily their funders but to the 
communities that their project aim to support. For example, when violence against 
minorities reached alarming levels the donors changed focus to the protection of 
minorities and then so did the community of NGO:s (KIPRED. 2005:14).  
Still the methods used by most of the NGOs do not contribute to the 
increasing of participation or bridging between the two communities since they 
are instead oriented towards holding week-long training programs (KIPRED, 
2005:22). NGO:s work in Kosovo is further complicated by the donor-
dependency negatively affecting the cooperation between NGOs considering that 
they are competitors for funds primarily. This competition among the NGOs for 
international organizations money not only creates difficulties for local ownership 
but it also disconnects the Kosovars from civil society (Claussen, 2006:14). 
Essentially having a civil society dependent on the international community limits 
the impact on reconciliation (Belloni, 2001:175). The OSCE acknowledged after 
the riots in March 2004 that the NGO:s that were driven by the international 
community in Kosovo had failed utterly in fostering inter-ethnic tolerance and 
becoming a force of moderation. The problem is that the NGOs created in Kosovo 
after the conflict in 1999 were modeled not on existing community networks and 
structures but on a western model (Johnsson, 2004:56f). A very telling example is 
that of a local gender trainer who is lectured by international workers on how 
important gender issues are (Ibid). This adds further tension to an already 
fragmented society. 
On the other hand positive developments over the years are that of the 
increasing number of Kosovo Serb NGOs, even though there are no indications 
that these are multiethnic, they do help ease the difficult situation of the minority 
(KIPRED, 2005:21). It is still highly problematic to include members of other 
communities within the ranks of predominately Albanian or Serb NGO:s. This is 
seen as a result of the high ethnic tensions in society at large since groups that 
support ethnic minorities are considered by some to be doing too much and 
therefore are “traitors” (Claussen, 2006:13). Other factors that could hinder the 
integration and participation of minorities in NGOs are insecurity and the lack of 
freedom of movement.  
In addition, many of the more established NGO:s are well connected with 
Albanian political parties since they offered services during the parallel institution 
phase of the conflict in Kosovo and are not viewed as independent (Nietsch, 2006: 
18). The March 2004 riots were a clear indication of this lack of independence, 
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 members of NGO:s associated to the KLA were believed to have taken part in the 
violence against Serbs. Furthermore NGO:s were reluctant to issue statements 
criticizing members of the own community (Nietsch, 2006:31). Considering the 
fact that civil society in Kosovo is divided on ethnic lines it is difficult to see any 
progress made in facilitating reconciliation when participation in NGO:s is seen  
as way of making money or  in the case of participation in multiethnic NGO:s, as 
betraying ones community.  
It is believed that the potential role that civil society in Kosovo could have 
played was missed when UNMIK failed to strengthen moderate forces within civil 
society short after the conflict ended (KIPRED, 2006:25). UNMIK failed to 
utilize civil society and its own unique position in Kosovo to initiate 
reconciliation on grass-root level. No commissions were created to address the 
question of post-war justice and establishing the truth of what happened 
(Ibid).What UNMIK did instead was create an institutional framework that was 
thought to guarantee the participation of Kosovo Serbs by allocating ten out of the 
120 seats in the assembly of Kosovo for the Serbs (Johnsson, 2004:21). What this 
essentially does is that it emphasizes differences and is a form of institutional 
segregation (KIPRED, 2006:26). Notwithstanding these institutional arrangements 
the Serb community continues to boycott elections. The latest general elections in 
Kosovo held November 2007 was marked with an extremely low turnout in 
general and with a near total boycott by the Serb community13. The elections were 
boycotted because many established Kosovo Serb political parties refused to take 
part in them in anticipation that whatever the outcome, Kosovo would declare its 
independence and this is unacceptable for the Kosovo Serbs. 
In sum, despite that the civil society sector in Kosovo has had an upsurge of 
NGOs after the conflict they face severe sustainability problems because they are 
very much donor-dependent and oriented at holding short-term training programs. 
NGOs are also viewed with suspicion over their motives. Civil society in Kosovo 
is therefore very much like other aspects of Kosovo daily life, segregated and 
more interested at bonding than bridging between communities. In addition to 
this, the current security situation in Kosovo contributes to difficulties of 
participation in multiethnic NGO:s. Another factor is that any participation in 
such organizations may be seen as betrayal of ones community. The failure is 
explained further by lack of support from UNMIK, the main authority in Kosovo, 
for locally driven reconciliation work in Kosovo.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 For in-depth analysis of the latest elections in Kosovo the reader is referred to the Council of Europe 
statement: http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/events/2007_kosovo/prelim_statement_en.asp 
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 5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine why there has been a failure to 
establish a base for the process of reconciliation in Kosovo. In order to do that, 
what the base of reconciliation is must be addressed and therefore the main 
components of reconciliation are conceptualized to include coexistence, the 
making of justice and reaching a common understanding of who did what during 
the conflict. This has then been operationalized through an analytical framework. 
This integrated framework uses three dimensions for analysis. Coexistence and 
integration, rule of law and justice and finally civil society and participation. All 
of the dimensions are very much interconnected. The fact that Kosovo is still 
divided on ethnic lines is an ever evident proof that reconciliation in Kosovo has 
so far failed. But what can explain this failure?  
First and foremost one must conclude that the international presence in 
Kosovo was faced with immense obstacles when it established almost nine years 
ago. The two communities, Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs had lived 
separated from one another for more than a decade. The segregation that 
characterized this era contributed to cementing prejudice and myths between 
Serbs and Albanians. This culminated further when war broke out and NATO 
intervened. It is still highly evident that the past continues to overshadow a sense 
of a common future. One of the specific goals of the extensive international 
presence that followed the bombing was to promote reconciliation and a 
multiethnic society.   
This thesis has found several factors hindering the establishment of a 
reconciliation process in Kosovo. Coexistence, considered to be the first step 
towards inter-ethnic reconciliation is far away from being the case on the ground. 
Minorities are trapped in enclaves where the institutions of Kosovo fail to reach 
and where fear of contact with the majority prevents the integration of the 
minority. It strikes me as odd that the international community apparently has not 
taken advantage of aspects in Albanian culture that would have the potential to 
contribute to coexistence. The “Kanuni i Lek Dukagjinit” has the potential to be a 
reference point for Albanians to reach the qualities prescribed in it. Qualities such 
as hospitality and honour.  
Another more evident explanation for the failure to create a firm base for 
reconciliation in Kosovo is the security situation that affects all dimensions. The 
lack of security for the minorities, whether it is minority Serbs in the south of 
Kosovo or minority Albanians in the north, means that peaceful coexistence is not 
possible. Fear and harassment when leaving the enclaves has obviously also 
created a need for parallel institutions in Kosovo. Obviously this only contributes 
to deepen the divisions amongst the two communities. This very same lack of 
security and subsequently freedom of movement prevents justice, a key 
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 component of reconciliation from being reached. The results of my analysis lead 
me to come to the conclusion that the weakness in the judicial system and the 
reaching of justice after conflict severely weakens the prospect for integration, 
participation in civil society and essentially the much needed coexistence. The 
rule of law also affects the decision of refugees to return. Returns are key if 
Kosovo is to be truly multiethnic. They will most definitely not return if they feel 
that they are returning to a place where a sense of impunity is manifested by the 
fact that very few war crimes have been brought before a court of law. As a fact 
very few have returned. I have found that retributive justice has been 
insufficiently applied in Kosovo where only a handful of cases of war crimes 
during the conflict out of thousands in waiting have been brought to court. Despite 
the goal of reconciliation and despite the importance of justice after the conflict 
the international community has put a lion share of its efforts into combating 
corruption and organized crime.  
When analyzing whether restorative justice has been applied as a means of 
compensating victims the analysis indicates that there is a clear will from the 
institutions to make sure that property rights are respected and that refugees upon 
return can repossess their property. Nevertheless it is clear that the lack of funding 
for the agency responsible with implementing property claims has severely 
hindered its effectiveness. 
Not only has the international community failed in strengthening the rule of 
law in Kosovo but has in one occasion given the impression that some individuals 
may be considered beyond the reach of law because of their position in society as 
heroes.  This most certainly does not contribute to individualizing guilt. The 
international war crimes tribunal in the Hague has an important role to play. 
Especially considering the inability of the Kosovo judicial system to prosecute 
war crimes. However, the affect of the international tribunals prosecutions are 
difficult to analyze since many polls show that Serbs do not feel that the court is 
fair and that it is out to primarily punish the Serbs.  
When the rule of law fails to address the past, NGOs can take on the role of 
lobbying governments to address injustices and itself be involved in repairing the 
broken relationship between the two communities. However my analysis shows 
that the failures in this dimension contribute to the overall failure to establish a 
base for reconciliation since NGOs are seen with suspicion in Kosovo. The reason 
for this is what seems to be the creation of NGOs for the main purpose of 
employment. What this essentially shows is that NGO:s fail to reach the 
population on the ground and when they eventually do they are limited by their 
dependency on donors. The projects undertaken are often short-term and to 
insufficient to facilitate any considerable participation.   
In my statement of purpose I stated that what was needed for reconciliation to 
take hold was for the international community to assist in locally driven projects 
but I have now come to the conclusion that this assistance must also prioritize the 
sustainability of the assisted local initiatives. Civil society is just as other aspects 
very much divided on ethnic lines. It is positive that international financial 
support has led to an increase of Serb NGO:s operating in Kosovo but my analysis 
shows that they have little potential to affect the overall situation in Kosovo as 
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 long as these NGOs are  not multiethnic. Multiethnic NGOs would be able to act 
as a bridge between the two communities.  
Additionally, my analysis leads me to believe that the disputed political status 
of Kosovo has a significant explanatory importance to failures encountered during 
the analysis. The Kosovo Serbs do not participate in elections not only due to 
security issues but also due to the fact that participation would legitimize what 
they see as an illegal separatist move. This means that not only society but also 
politics are divided along political and ethnic lines exhibiting little trust for one 
another. For the time being what seems to have been created in Kosovo is what is 
termed as negative peace. How the new country will handle the process towards 
reconciliation remains of particular interest when the handover of more 
responsibilities towards the democratically elected institutions occurs.  
  
 25
 6 References 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, 2001. Reconciliation, justice and coexistence: Theory 
and Practice. USA: Lexington Books   
Amnesty International, January 2008. The Challenge to fix a failed UN Justice 
Mission in Kosovo. 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/001/2008/en/EUR700012008
en.html (Accessed 04.05.08) 
Amnesty International, 2006. Kosovo (Serbia): The UN in Kosovo – A legacy of 
impunity. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR70/015/2006/en/dom-
EUR700152006en.pdf (Accessed 04.05.08) 
Belloni, Roberto, 2001. “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No 2, pp. 163 – 180. 
Bloomfield, David, Barnes, Teresa & Huyse, Luc, 2003. Reconciliation After 
Violent Conflict: A Handbook. Halmstad: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
Clark, Howard, 2000. Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press 
Claussen, Kathleen, 2006. “Life Cycles of Civil Society and Civic Participation in 
Kosovo”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of The Midwest Political 
Science Association, Palmar House Hilton, Chicago, Illionois. 
http://ww.allacademic.com/meta/p140039_index.html (Accessed on 11.05.08) 
Crocker, David A, 2003. “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative 
Framework” in Prager, Carol A & Govier, Trudy (ed), Dilemmas of 
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts. Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 
Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wängnerud, Lena, 2005. 
Metodpraktikan – konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 
Stockholm: Gotab. 
Eide, Kai, 2005. In Annan, Kofi, Letter dated 7 October 2005 from the Secretary-
General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2005/635, 
http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf  (Accessed 03.05.08) 
Estrada-Hollenbeck, Mica, 2001. “The Attainment of Justice through Restoration, 
Not Litigation: The Subjective Road to Reconciliation” in Abu-Nimer, 
Mohammed (ed), Reconciliation, justice and coexistence: Theory and 
Practice. USA: Lexington Books 
Fatic, Aleksandar, 2001. Reconciliation via the war crimes tribunal? Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd 
Forget, Marc, 2003. “Crime as Interpersonal Conflict: Reconciliation between 
Victim and Offender” in Prager, Carol A & Govier, Trudy (ed), Dilemmas of 
Reconciliation: Cases and Concepts. Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 
Galtung, John, 2001. “After Violence, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, and 
Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence” in 
 26
 Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (ed), Reconciliation, justice and coexistence: Theory 
and Practice. USA: Lexington Books 
Hart, Berry, 2001. “Refugee Return in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Coexistence 
before Reconciliation” in Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (ed), Reconciliation, 
justice and coexistence: Theory and Practice. USA: Lexington Books 
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, March 2008. Forgotten World: Kosovo 
Enclaves. 
http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/1st%20mission%20to%20Serb%20enclaves%
20in%20Kosovo,%20report.doc (Accessed 08.05.08) 
Human Rights Watch, March 2008. Kosovo. Vol.20. No.2. 
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/kosovo0308/kosovo0308web.pdf (Accessed 
04.05.08) 
Human Rights Watch, February 2008. A Human Rights agenda for a New Kosovo. 
Number 1 http://hrw.org/backgrounder/2008/kosovo0208/kosovo0208web.pdf 
(Accessed 04.05.08) 
Hysa, Ylber, 2004. Kosovo: “A permanent international protectorate?” in 
Newman, Edward & Rich, Roland (ed), The UN Role in Promoting 
Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality. New York: United Nations 
University Press. 
Itano, Nicole, March 31, 2008. Independence Strains Kosovo’s Police Force. The 
Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0331/p04s01-
woeu.html (Accessed 08.05.08) 
Johnsson, Jessica, 2004. International assistance to democratization and 
reconciliation in Kosovo. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research. 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/other_pub/International_assistance_Kossov
o_Johnsson_05_05_06.pdf (Accessed 29.04.08) 
Judah, Tim, 2002. Kosovo: War and Revenge. USA: Yale University Press. 
KIPRED, 2006. A changing society, a changing civil society: Kosovo’s NGO 
Sector After the War. Policy Research Series, Paper no.3. 
http://www.kipred.net/site/documents/A_Changing_Society_A_Changing_Civ
il_Society_Kosovos_NGO_Sector_After_the_War.pdf (accessed 08.05.08) 
Knudsen, Tonny Brems & Laustsen, Carsten Bagge, 2006. ”The politics of 
international trusteeship” in Knudsen, Tonny Brems & Laustsen, Carsten 
Bagge (ed), Kosovo between war and peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and 
International Trusteeship. New York: Routledge 
Kriesberg, Louis, 2001. “Changing forms of Coexistence” in Abu-Nimer, 
Mohammed (ed), Reconciliation, justice and coexistence: Theory and 
Practice. USA: Lexington Books 
Kühle, Lene & Laustsen, Bagge, 2006. “The Kosovo myth: nationalism and 
revenge” in Knudsen, Tonny Brems & Laustsen, Carsten Bagge (ed), Kosovo 
between war and peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International 
Trusteeship. New York: Routledge 
KPA, 2008. The Kosovo Property Agency - Annual Report 2007. 
http://www.kpaonline.org/PDFs/KPA2007AnnualEnglish.pdf (Accessed 
04.05.08) 
 27
 Lederach, John Paul, 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies. Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press 
Merriam, Sharan B., 1994. Fallstudien som forskningsmetod. Lund: 
Studentlitteratur. 
Montville, Joseph V, 2001. “Justice and the Burdens of History” in Abu-Nimer, 
Mohammed (ed), Reconciliation, justice and coexistence: Theory and 
Practice. USA: Lexington Books 
Nietsch, Julia, 2006. Civil Society in Kosovo: The Interaction between local 
NGOs and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government,   
http://www.oefz.at/oefzII/Conferences/Kosovo2006/Documents-
Referenten/Vortraege/Text/JuliaNietsch_civil_society_Kosovo0106.pdf 
(Accessed 27.04.08) 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, 2005. “Why the Rule of Law Matters” in Diamond, Larry 
& Morlino, Leonardo (ed), Assessing the Quality of Democracy. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Orjuela, Camilla, 2003. “Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society”, 
pp.195-212, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.40, No.2, London: Sage 
Publications. 
OSCE, 2003. Parallel structures in Kosovo. Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, mission in Kosovo: Department of Human Rights and 
Rule of Law. http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf 
(accessed 08.05.08) 
OSCE, 1999. Permanent Council decision 305. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/1999/07/2577_en.pdf 
Pankhurst, Donna, 1999. “Issues of justice and reconciliation in complex political 
emergencies: conceptualizing reconciliation, justice and peace.” Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.1, pp. 239-256. 
Söberg, Lene Mosegaard, 2006. “The Kosovo experiment: peacebuilding through 
an international trusteeship” in Knudsen, Tonny Brems & Laustsen, Carsten 
Bagge (ed), Kosovo between war and peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and 
International Trusteeship. New York: Routledge 
Teutsch, Christopher, 2005. “Working paper: Kosovo’s Burdensome Path to 
Economic Development and Interethnic Coexistence”, Swiss Peace 
Foundation, FAST Risk Profile Kosovo. 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/sp-yug-31aug.pdf (Accessed 
on 03.05.08) 
Theissen, Gunnar, 2004. Supporting justice, Co-existence and Reconciliation after 
Armed Conflict: Strategies for Dealing with the Past. Berghof Research 
Center for Constructive Conflict Management. http://berghof-
handbook.net/uploads/download/theissen_handbook.pdf (Accessed on 
03.05.08) 
UNDP, 2003. Early Warning Report: Kosovo. Early Warning System, No.4, May-
August 2003.   
      http://mirror.undp.org/kosovo/publications/ews4/EWS_4_Eng.pdf (accessed 
03.05.08) 
 28
 UNDP, 2005. Strengthening Civil Society for Government Dialogue. United 
Nations Development Program Kosovo. 
http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/Civil-Society.pdf (Accessed 
03.05.08) 
UNHCR, 2006. “UNCHR’s Position on the Continued International Protection 
Needs of Individuals from Kosovo” http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=4492bdaa (Accessed on 
11.05.08) 
UNSCR 1244, 1999. On the situation relating Kosovo. 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm (Accessed 06.05.08) 
Vickers, Miranda, 1998. Between Serb and Albanian: A history of Kosovo. 
London: Hurst & Company. 
Weiner, Eugene, 1998. “Coexistence Work: A New Profession” in Weiner, 
Eugene (ed), The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence. New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Company 
Wolf, Tina, December 04, 2007. “Kosovo Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo still lack 
freedom of movement”. World Politics Review. 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1405 (Accessed 
08.05.08) 
Wood, Nicholas, April 08, 2007. “Kosovo War Crimes Trial splits West and 
Prosecutors”. International Herald Tribune. 
 
 29
  30
7 Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Vickers, 1998:xviii) 
